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NOTE
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN ALASKA:
JUSTIFICATIONS AND PROPOSED
COURSES OF REFORM
This Note evaluates the merit system of judicial selection, reten-
tion, and evaluation in Alaska and suggests a variety of potential
reforms in light of the ongoing debate over how best to balance
the competing values of judicial independence and accountability.
This Note describes the historical and political context in which
Alaska’s system of merit selection was adopted and evaluates the
arguments for and against merit selection, assessing the concept’s
strengths and weaknesses in light of the experiences of Alaska and
other states.  The Author responds to criticisms of Alaska’s merit
selection system by offering four potential modifications designed
to provide for meaningful judicial accountability without sacri-
ficing judicial independence .
I.  INTRODUCTION
Since even before the founding of our nation, there has been
disagreement regarding the appropriate method of selecting judges
in a democracy.  Over the centuries, this debate has focused on de-
termining the appropriate balance between the competing values
of judicial independence and judicial accountability.  The choice of
a particular method for selecting the judges who will interpret and
apply the law implicates one of the fundamental principles at the
heart of democratic theory—the equal, blind, and fair administra-
tion of justice.  As Alaska weighed these issues on the eve of state-
hood in 1956, it had the benefit of almost two centuries of federal
and state experience in judicial selection.  After much debate and
consideration, delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention
adopted the merit selection model for selecting judges.  This system
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of judicial selection, retention, and evaluation, which involves non-
partisan commissions presenting a list of qualified applicants to the
governor for appointment, remains largely unchanged and contin-
ues to serve Alaska to this day.
Alaska’s system, however, has not been free of controversy.
The debate over judicial selection in Alaska has paralleled the on-
going struggle across the nation to achieve a judiciary that is both
independent and accountable.  This Note evaluates the arguments
for and against merit selection of judges and the historical devel-
opment of and justifications for Alaska’s particular version of the
merit selection model.  Almost half of a century removed from the
Alaska Constitutional Convention, this Note is intended to serve
both as a critical assessment of the performance of merit selection
in Alaska and as a reevaluation of the strength of the merit selec-
tion concept in light of the experiences of Alaska and other states.
The Note concludes that merit selection remains the most appro-
priate and effective method of judicial selection, but recommends
that Alaska consider a series of minor reforms in order to ensure
that judges are held accountable to the public they serve.
II.  THE HISTORICAL DEBATE OVER JUDICIAL SELECTION
Montesquieu argued that because the judiciary is the weakest
of the three departments of power, “there is no liberty, if the power
of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive pow-
ers.”1  Alexander Hamilton concurred with Montesquieu in the
primacy of judicial independence and argued that it was so impor-
tant as to justify life appointment and salary protection for federal
judges.2  “[N]othing will contribute so much . . . to that independent
spirit in the judges,” Hamilton argued, as “the permanent tenure of
judicial offices.”3
Many, however, strongly disagreed with Hamilton’s position.
The anti-Federalist writer Brutus was appalled by the amount of
power vested in the United States Supreme Court with little corre-
sponding accountability.4  “In short, [Supreme Court justices] are
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power
under heaven.  Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel
1. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS,
Book XI, Ch. VI 202 (David Wallace Carrithers ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1997)
(1748).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 526-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
3. Id.
4. Brutus XV, The Problem of Judicial Review, in READINGS IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 325 (Mary P. Nichols & David K. Nichols eds., 1990).
FINLEY_CORRECTED.DOC 05/07/03  4:35 PM
2003] MERIT SELECTION OF JUDGES 51
themselves independent of heaven itself.”5  Thomas Jefferson be-
lieved that it was critically important that the judiciary remain in-
dependent of the other branches of government, but that it was
equally imperative that judges remain accountable to the nation.6
He believed that “judges should face the public from time to time
to ensure they remained true to their constitutional oaths.”7  “A ju-
diciary independent of a king or executive alone, is a good thing,”
Jefferson opined, “but independence of the will of the nation is a
solecism, at least in a republican government.”8
Hamilton’s view prevailed in the U.S. Constitution9 and, ini-
tially, at the state level as well.  The first twenty-nine states to enter
the Union had appointed judiciaries.10  However, influenced by the
populist views of Jefferson and Andrew Jackson, who was known
to refer to judges as “politicians who hide their politics under their
robes,”11 the trend soon shifted toward election of state judges.  In
1832, Mississippi became the first state to elect appellate judges,
and every state that entered the Union between 1846 and 1912
provided for judicial elections.12  This trend concerned many who
espoused the importance of judicial independence.13  In 1835,
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that
[s]ome [state] constitutions make the members of their courts
elective and subject them to frequent elections.  I dare to predict
that these innovations will sooner or later have disastrous results
and that one day it will be seen that by diminishing the inde-
pendence of the judges in this way, not only was the judicial
power attacked, but the democratic republic itself.14
During the 20th century a majority of states returned to judi-
cial appointment by governors, legislators, or both.15  Beginning in
1940, many states combined judicial  appointments with some form
of merit selection process and retention elections.16  Today, gover-
5. Id.
6. Troy A. Eid, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Case Against
Electing Judges, COLO. LAW., Jul. 2001, at 71.
7. Id.
8. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1445, 1446 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III.




14. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 122-23 (Sanford
Kessler ed., Hackett Publishing Co., 2000) (1835).
15. Eid, supra note 6, at 7.
16. Id.
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nors directly fill vacancies on the highest appellate courts in
twenty-eight states, but in all but four of those states, governors are
required to appoint from slates provided by nominating commis-
sions.17  Fifteen states use some form of merit selection in nomi-
nating candidates for judicial appointments.18  Twenty-one states
still hold judicial elections (nine partisan, twelve non-partisan), and
Virginia provides for election of its supreme court justices by the
legislature.19  The governors of eighteen states have discretion for
trial courts while nominating commissions recommend slates for
the governor in twenty-seven states.20
III.  JUDICIAL SELECTION IN ALASKA
A. Alaska’s Merit Selection System
The “merit selection” plan was first conceived in 1913, but not
adopted in any form by a U.S. state until Missouri voted for it in
1940.21  Merit selection of judges is still referred to as the “Missouri
Bar Plan” or the “Missouri plan.”22  Generally, merit selection sys-
tems use a non-partisan nominating commission of lawyers and
non-lawyers to identify and evaluate candidates for judicial posi-
tions.  These commissions then present a list of the two or three
most qualified applicants to the appointing authority (usually the
governor), who chooses one candidate to appoint to the bench.
Judges are then subject to evaluation by the commission and the
general public and are periodically required to appear on the ballot
for a “retention” vote.
Alaska incorporated its method of judicial selection into its
constitution upon statehood in 1956.  The Alaska Constitution es-
17. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001 Online,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t170.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2001).
The states providing for direct gubernatorial appointment are California, Maine,
New Hampshire, and New Jersey.
18. Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elections: Ex-
amining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2
MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 75 (1997).  The states include Alaska, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.  Id. at 75 n.25.
19. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001 Online, supra note 17.
20. Eid, supra note 6, at 7.
21. Honorable Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan: A
Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Envi-
ronment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 318 (1997).
22. Honorable B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1442, Appendix (2001).
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tablished the Alaska Judicial Council23 to nominate candidates for
judgeships at all four levels of state court.24  The Council provides a
list of at least two qualified applicants to the governor, who then
appoints one individual from that list to fill an existing or impend-
ing vacancy.25  After an initial term of three years, all Alaska judges
must stand in a retention election.26  The particular judge is not op-
posed by another candidate, and voters are presented with only a
“yes” or “no” choice.27  If retained by voters, judges then serve a
full term of a specified length before they stand for retention
again.28
The Council is made up of seven individuals: three attorney
members appointed by the Alaska Bar Association Board of Gov-
ernors; three non-attorney members appointed by the governor
and confirmed by a majority of the members of the legislature in
joint session; and the Chief Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court,
who serves as the ex officio chair.29  The Alaska Constitution re-
quires that Council appointments be made “with due consideration
to area representation and without regard to political affiliation.”30
In addition to evaluating applications and nominating candi-
dates for judicial vacancies, the Council has two additional duties.
The Alaska Constitution requires the Council to conduct studies
and recommend improvements in the administration of justice,31
and various statutes charge the Council with evaluating the per-
23. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5.
24. ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE: A
PROFILE OF ALASKA’S JUDICIAL APPLICANTS AND JUDGES 5 (May 1999) [hereinaf-
ter FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE].
Alaska has a unified court system, meaning there are no local or county
courts.  The constitution establishes the supreme court and the general-
jurisdiction trial court and gives the legislature authority to establish other courts.
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-3.  Since statehood, the legislature has created two
other courts by statute—a limited-jurisdiction trial court (the district court),
ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.010 (Michie 2002), and an intermediate court of criminal
appeals (the Alaska Court of Appeals), Id. § 22.07.010.
25. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5.
26. Id. § 6.
27. Id.
28. Following retention, supreme court justices serve a term of ten years, court
of appeals judges serve for eight years, superior court judges serve for six years,
and district court judges serve for four years.  See id. § 6; ALASKA STAT. §
15.15.030(10) (Michie 2002).
29. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8 (noting that members serve six-year staggered
terms, except for the Chief Justice, who serves for three years).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 9.
FINLEY_CORRECTED.DOC 05/07/03  4:35 PM
54 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:1
formance of judges and making that information available to the
public.32  The Council may, but is not required to, make recom-
mendations to voters as to whether a particular judge should or
should not be retained in office.33
B. Dissent in Alaska
As in other areas of the nation, not everyone in Alaska is
happy with their system of judicial selection.  Many Alaskans be-
lieve that the state’s system of judicial selection does not allow for
enough public input, either through contested judicial elections or
legislative confirmation of appointed judges.34  Others have the
perception that judges are abandoning their constitutional roles as
interpreters of the law and have begun writing law, an essentially
legislative function that should be responsive to public opinion.35
These sentiments are consistent with a nationwide growth in sup-
port of the concept of a judiciary accountable to the people.
Advocates of increased accountability for Alaska’s judges cite
a number of cases as examples of an overly active judiciary.  For
example, in Area G Home & Landowners Org., Inc. v. City of An-
chorage,36 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted a provision of
Anchorage’s municipal charter so as to allow the city to expand its
police service area to include a new community (and impose ac-
companying municipal taxes) without affording the residents of the
area a separate vote on the annexation.37  Another example is Bess
v. Ulmer,38 which rejected a ballot initiative limiting prisoners’
rights as an inappropriate constitutional “revision” and deleted
portions of a ballot initiative amending the Alaska Constitution to
32. ALASKA STAT. § 22.05.100 (duty to provide information to public on reten-
tion of supreme court justice), § 22.07.060 (duty to provide information to public
on retention of court of appeals judge), § 22.10.150 (duty to provide information
to public on retention of superior court judge), § 22.15.195 (duty to provide infor-
mation to public on retention of district court judge).
33. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 24, at 11.
34. See, e.g., Senator Robin Taylor, Sponsor Statement for SJR 22, April 4,
2001, available at http://www.akrepublicans.org/22ndleg/spst/spstsjr022.shtml (last
visited Jan. 30, 2003).
35. Press Release, Alaska Senators Loren Leman and Dave Donley, Resolu-
tion Proposes Increased Accountability from Judiciary (Mar. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.akrepublicans.org/preleman103051999.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Press Release].
36. 927 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1996).
37. Id. at 733-39.
38. 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999).
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prevent the state from recognizing same-sex marriages.39  Critics of-
ten cite these cases and others as evidence of the unresponsive na-
ture of the Alaska judiciary and the dire need for holding judges
accountable for their decisions on the bench.40
Several recent legislative efforts appear to be manifestations
of a growing suspicion and distrust of Alaska’s courts.  In 1999, a
proposed constitutional amendment was introduced that would
have significantly altered the system of judicial selection and reten-
tion.41  Senate Joint Resolution 15 sought to increase the frequency
of retention elections and proposed to discontinue the practice of
limiting the governor’s judicial appointees to those nominated by
the Judicial Council.42  Instead, the amendment would have allowed
the governor to appoint any licensed attorney in Alaska to fill a ju-
dicial vacancy subject to confirmation by a joint session of the leg-
islature.43  In 2001, another proposal would have reduced the term
lengths of supreme court justices from ten years to six and the
terms of superior court judges from six years to four.44  Most re-
cently, a 2002 bill currently under consideration by the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee would reduce the term lengths of Court of Ap-
peals judges from eight years to six.45
IV.  ASSESSING THE MERITS OF MERIT SELECTION
A. Arguments in Favor of Merit Selection
Since 1940, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have
adopted merit selection for all levels of their respective judicial sys-
tems46 and no state has ever abandoned a system of merit selection.
Merit selection is often cited as an ideal to aspire to by reformers in
states that continue to choose judges by popular elections.47  For
example, before becoming the Federal Director of Homeland Se-
39. Id. at 987-89.
40. See Press Release, supra note 35; see generally Dave Donley et al., Bess v.
Ulmer—The Supreme Court Stumbles and the Subsistence Amendment Falls, 19
ALASKA L. REV. 295 (2002).
41. S.J. Res. 15, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. S.J. Res. 22, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001).
45. S.B. 159, 22d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002).
46. Stephan Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search For Fairness,
Independence, and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 674 n.57 (2001).
47. Geoff Yuda, An Election, A Coming Succession of Chief Justices and the
Debate Over Merit Selection Will Influence the Future Course of Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Court,  PA. LAW., July-Aug. 2001, at 18-19.
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curity, Governor Tom Ridge strongly supported the adoption of a
merit selection system in Pennsylvania.48  Ridge and other propo-
nents of merit selection cite the unique nature of the judiciary that
distinguishes judicial elections from executive and legislative elec-
tions.  “[W]e cannot ask the people to make good judgments on ju-
dicial candidates,” Ridge argued, “when we expressly prohibit
those candidates from sharing their views on the issues.”49  Over
the years, a number of arguments have developed in favor of merit
selection.
1.  Judicial Independence.  Merit selection systems are built
largely upon the ideals expressed by the Federalists and embodied
in the U.S. Constitution.  The primary aim of merit selection is to
ensure judicial independence by removing judges from the political
arena.50  Nonetheless, merit selection systems generally allow for
more judicial accountability than the Federalists envisioned by re-
quiring that judges stand for retention elections.  Retention elec-
tions are intended to eliminate the partisan, combative elements
that characterize contested elections.  The idea is that the individ-
ual judge runs only against himself and is judged by the voters
based on his record instead of his party affiliation or campaign
promises.  The absence of an opponent reduces the pressure or in-
centive to make unethical or inappropriate campaign statements in
the hopes of attracting voters.
Merit selection also provides a degree of independence that
the federal system of life appointment does not provide.  Systems
of merit selection similar to Alaska’s diminish the link between
judges and the executive that appointed them.  Under the federal
system, the President is free to choose any candidate that he thinks
the Senate will confirm.  Under the merit system, the governor is
limited in his appointment power by the list of candidates provided
by the nominating commission.  Therefore, federal judges are more
directly indebted to the executive for their office than judges ap-
pointed under the merit system.  Although federal judges, espe-
cially Supreme Court justices, have often diverged from the ideo-
logical course anticipated by the President that nominated them,
Presidents do select judges that they perceive to be in line with
their views and have tried to “pack” the federal courts so as to gain
favorable rulings on certain policies.  Under the merit system, such
48. Id.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
273, 309-10 (2002); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There
One “Best” Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 31 (1995).
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efforts at executive control over the judiciary would be much more
difficult.
2.  Providing for a High Quality Judiciary.  The idea behind
merit selection is to take politics out of the judicial selection proc-
ess and ensure that only the most highly qualified individuals are
considered for nomination to the bench.  In 1956, Alaska adopted
its version of the merit system in an effort to ensure a “strong,
fearless, and independent judiciary.”51  The Judiciary Committee of
the Alaska Constitutional Convention aspired to formulate a sys-
tem of judicial selection based on prior precedent and experience
that would minimize political considerations, attract good candi-
dates, and ensure the quality of the appointed judges.52  Alaska’s
merit selection system was based largely on the Missouri Plan53 and
was intended to be “a combination of the appointive and the elec-
tive.”54
3.  Removing Political Considerations from Judicial Decision-
Making.  Merit selection is intended to remove political considera-
tions from the host of factors that judges consider when rendering
decisions.  Fair and equal justice is threatened when judges are
tempted to decide cases in accord with what result will garner the
most support among the electorate and produce the least degree of
impassioned response by a future campaign opponent.  As United
States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recently
noted, “if judges are subject to regular elections they are likely to
feel that they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of
every publicized case.”55  It is possible that contested judicial elec-
tions could lead to good judges being voted out of office on the ba-
sis of a single controversial and highly publicized decision.56  For
example, in 1967, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice George Currie
was defeated in his re-election campaign largely as a result of his
51. Alaska Judicial Council, Alaska Constitutional Convention Minutes Con-
cerning Judicial Selection and Retention 607 (1956), available at
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/general/akccron.htm [hereinafter Minutes].
52. Id. at 584-86, 588.
53. Id. at 584; MO. CONST. art. V, § 25.
54. Minutes, supra note 51, at 585.
55. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542 (2002)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
56. See, e.g., Paul J. DeMuniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 387-88 (2002) (“Just as
alarming is the increasingly blatant partisan attacks launched on courts and judges
during judicial campaigns and following controversial decisions.”).
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vote in a 1965 case57 allowing Milwaukee’s major league baseball
team, the Braves, to move to Atlanta.58  Currie’s opponent, Mil-
waukee circuit judge Robert Hansen, used the Braves case to bring
public attention to an otherwise uncontroversial campaign, and
even received endorsements from popular former Braves players
Johnny Logan and Eddie Matthews.59
4.  Avoiding Campaign Finance Issues and the Appearance of
Impropriety.  Another factor often cited in support of merit selec-
tion systems is the growing influence of money in politics.  Across
the United States, spending in every form of judicial race has in-
creased significantly.  In 1986, two partisan supreme court races in
Alabama cost a total of $237,281; in 1996, that total increased to
more than $2 million.60  In 1980, the non-partisan race for Ohio
chief justice cost $100,000; in 1986, it cost $2.7 million.61
Equally disturbing is the source of most of that money.  One
study found that from 1979 to 1997, the legal community (lawyers,
legal political-action committees, and law firms) contributed more
than 62% of the approximately $12.8 million raised for thirty-five
competitive Pennsylvania Supreme Court elections.62  Because at-
torneys are invariably the segment of the population most inter-
ested in judicial elections, they are also considerably more likely to
make contributions to judicial campaigns.  Judicial elections force
judges to rely on the contributions of the same individuals on
whose motions and arguments they will be ruling, creating a per-
ception of impropriety.  A 1993 opinion poll conducted by the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati’s Institute for Policy Research found that 58%
of Ohio voters believed that contributions influenced judicial deci-
sion-making.63  Similar polls found that 70% of voters in North Da-
57. Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Wis. 1966) (hold-
ing that the Braves’ move to Atlanta did not violate Wisconsin antitrust laws).
58. Michael Koehler, Baseball, Apple Pie and Judicial Elections: An Analysis
of the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court Race, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 223, 223-24 (2001).
59. Id. at 237.
60. Scott William Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the Judicial
Selection Process in Alabama, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1276 (2001).
61. Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, 84 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998, at 69.
62. James Eisenstein, Financing Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court Candidates, 84
JUDICATURE 10, 16-17 (2000) (finding that the legal community accounted for
90% of the money that could be linked to an economic sector).
63. Cited in Suster v. Marshall 149 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir. 1998).
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kota and 56% of voters in Louisiana believed that judges were in-
fluenced by campaign contributions.64
The paradigm state for the negative effect of money on judi-
cial integrity appears to be Texas.65  More than 40% of the money
raised for the campaigns of the seven winning candidates for the
Texas Supreme Court in 1994 and 1996 came from lawyers with
cases pending before the court.66  In a recent Texas poll, 83% of re-
spondents said they thought the decisions of Texas judges were ei-
ther strongly or somewhat influenced by campaign contributions.67
Even more disturbing, in one poll, 48% of Texas judges admitted
that contributions influenced judicial decisions.68
In a world of big money politics, merit selection is justified as
an appropriate compromise between the competing values of judi-
cial independence and judicial accountability.  The benefits of
merit selection are that: (1) it insulates judges from the burdens
and pressures of competitive elections; (2) it emphasizes individual
qualifications instead of political power or influence; (3) it provides
a screening process that ensures the governor’s appointment power
is limited; (4) it promotes judicial stability; and (5) it allows for ac-
countability and democratic participation by requiring that judges
stand for retention elections.  In theory, merit selection provides
the best of both worlds.  The nomination process ensures quality
while retention elections ensure integrity.
B. The Arguments Against Merit Selection
In practice, merit selection has proven to be far from the per-
fect method that some envisioned.  Ultimately merit selection can-
not achieve its primary goal of an apolitical judiciary because poli-
tics inevitably permeate any situation where coveted positions are
at stake.  Moreover, retention elections have not succeeded in cre-
ating a non-competitive, influence-free method of providing for a
publicly accountable judiciary.  The experiences of many states
with merit selection demonstrate that merit systems and retention
64. Dale Wetzel, North Dakota Residents Support Courts, But with Reserva-
tions, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, at 6C; Michelle Millhollon, Poll: Funds Can
Sway Louisiana Judges, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 10, 2000, at 1-A.
65. See generally, Payola Justice: How Texas Supreme Court Justices Raise
Money from Court Litigants, available at http://www.tpj.org/reports/payola
/_intro.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (discussing the links between campaign con-
tributions and the docket of the Texas Supreme Court).
66. Eid, supra note 6, at 72.
67. Id.
68. Peter A. Joy, Insulation Needed for Elected Judges, 22 NAT’L L.J., Jan. 10,
2000, at A19.
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elections do not eliminate, but instead alter the problems associ-
ated with judicial selection.
Merit selection, of course, does not take the politics out of ju-
dicial selection.  Instead, it only changes the politics involved in the
selection process.  Even the staunchest advocates of merit selection
concede that politics enter into the process to a certain extent.69
Missouri, the birthplace of merit selection, has had its own prob-
lems with political manipulation of the selection process.  In 1984,
the governor of Missouri allegedly collaborated with the state’s ju-
dicial nominating commission to manipulate the selection process
and appoint his Chief of Staff, who had no judicial experience, to
the Missouri Supreme Court.70  One Missouri state court judge de-
scribed the selection process as “too secretive, undemocratic, not
representative, too political, and not accountable or responsive to
the public.”71  Some have even contended that merit selection sys-
tems discriminate against minority candidates.72
The problems experienced in Missouri and the criticism ex-
pressed by some commentators highlight merit selection’s failure to
remove politics from the judicial selection process.  A merit system
of choosing judges eliminates the public spectacle of a contested
popular election, but it does not eliminate the potential for subtler
and more corrupting political influences, including money, crony-
ism, and political activism.  The limited number of people involved
in merit systems like Alaska’s actually increases the potential for
secretive deals and private collaboration.
Compounding the problem of private political dealings is the
general lack of public knowledge of and interest in judicial races.
State judicial elections in general have never been traditional fire-
storms of excitement or controversy.  The “benevolent public” has
historically re-elected incumbents due more to the lack of an ap-
parent reason to vote the judge out, than for any affirmative reason
to reward the judge with another term.73  Judicial retention elec-
tions are generally less visible than contested elections, making
them even more prone to problems related to an uninformed pub-
lic.74  Lack of voter information about judicial candidates has be-
69. See, e.g., Minutes, supra note 51, at 594, 601.
70. See Daugherty, supra note 21, at 328.
71. Id. at 341.
72. Id. at 340 (stating that the Missouri merit system has been challenged un-
der the Voting Rights Act on the grounds that it “results in under-representation
of minorities”); Rene A. Torrado, Jr., The Challenge of Merit Selection, 10 CBA
REC. 10, 10-11 (Apr. 1996).
73. Dann & Hansen, supra note 22, at 1437.
74. Id. at 1437-38.
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come a growing concern both among commentators and the gen-
eral public.75  A series of Alaska statutes imposes a significant duty
on the Alaska Judicial Council to evaluate judicial candidates and
convey that information to the voting public.76  Yet despite
Alaska’s status as a national leader in providing voter information,
a study of the 1996 retention elections revealed that only 58% of
Alaska voters were aware of the judicial performance evaluation
reports made available by the Alaska Judicial Council.77  The re-
port also revealed that even fewer voters (approximately 33% in
Anchorage) actually used the reports in making their voting deci-
sion.78
In many instances, merit selection coupled with retention elec-
tions has not successfully avoided the modern problems that plague
systems of judicial election.  For example, a retention election ac-
tually holds the record for spending in a judicial election.79  In the
1986 California Supreme Court retention elections, three justices
and their opposition spent a combined $11.5 million ($17.5 million
when adjusted for inflation).80  It made no difference that Califor-
nia used a merit selection system81 or that the justices were running
unopposed.  Alabama Supreme Court Justice Harold See has ob-
served that “the same problems of tone and large expenditures are
present—perhaps in an even more pernicious form—in [the merit
system].”82
The 1986 California retention elections are often cited as an
example of business interests and special interest groups pouring
exorbitant amounts of money into a media campaign opposing a
judge because of decisions protecting the rights of consumers, ten-
75. Id.
76. See supra note 32.
77. Dann & Hansen, supra note 22, at 1439 (citing KEVIN M. ESTERLING &
KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR
STATES: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 37 (1998)).
78. Id. at 1439 n.82.
79. Roy A. Schotland, Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Introduction:
Personal Views, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1361, 1362-63 n.4 (2001).
80. Id.
81. Uniquely, California employs a “reverse merit selection system.”  The
governor recommends candidates to the Commission on Judicial Nominees
Evaluation (JNE or “Jenny Commission”), which then surveys attorneys and
holds a confirmation hearing.  Eid, supra note 6, at 71; see CAL. GOV’T CODE §
12011.5 (West 1992).
82. Harold See, Comment: Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 145 (Summer 1998).
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ants, and employees.83  This characterization, however, is slightly
misleading because a significant portion of the more than $6 mil-
lion raised in opposition to the justices came from small contribu-
tions by individuals.84  Some commentators have instead chosen to
characterize the 1986 California retention elections as an instance
of overwhelming grassroots opposition to the justices based on
“genuine, strong, and widespread outrage at a justice who put her-
self above the law.”85
The California election is just one example of how retention
elections and nominating commissions are unable to insulate
judges from the will of governors or interest groups.  Tennessee
Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost her 1996 retention elec-
tion based entirely on her decision in one death penalty case, State
v. Odom.86  The Republican Party and the Tennessee Conservative
Union led a campaign of radio and direct mail that ultimately de-
feated White and secured a vacancy on the court for Governor
Don Sundquist to fill.87  After White’s defeat, Sundquist empha-
sized the blow that he had succeeded in striking to judicial inde-
pendence: “[s]hould a judge look over his shoulder about whether
they’re going to be thrown out of office?  I hope so.”88
Other retention elections have also resulted in judges being
voted out of office based on specific decisions or opinions as op-
posed to a pattern of misconduct or overstepping the bounds of ju-
dicial authority.  In 1996, Nebraska Supreme Court Justice David
Lanphier was defeated by opposition efforts based on a series of
decisions redefining the state’s second-degree murder statute and
his rejection of term limits for Nebraska officials.89  In 1998, two
California Supreme Court justices were opposed in their retention
83. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1985, 1986-87 (1988); Faulkner, supra note 60, at 1279.
84. Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A
Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
2007, 2038 (1988).
85. Schotland, supra note 79, at 1362-63 n.4.
86. 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996); Pamela Wade, White’s Defeat Poses Legal
Dilemma; How is a Replacement Justice Picked?, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 3, 1996, at
A1.
87. Wade, supra note 86, at A6.
88. Id. at A1.
89. Dann & Hansen, supra note 22, at 1435-36; Faulkner, supra note 60, at
1279 (citing Hansen, supra note 61, at 70).
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elections by a $2 million campaign in response to their decision in
an abortion case.90
These cases of contentious, highly financed retention elections
show that the merit selection system does not go as far in creating
an independent judiciary as its proponents might hope.  In fact, a
system of merit selection coupled with judicial retention elections
can actually lead to less judicial independence than a system of
popular judicial elections.  The Penny White case in Tennessee
presents a perfect example of how an ambitious governor, given a
favorable political atmosphere, can create a vacancy on the bench
with minimal effort.  Retention elections remove the adversarial
element from a campaign and leave a judge to face only whichever
interest groups might be unhappy with his or her views.  Judicial
ethics preclude judges from saying or promising certain things in a
race for office, but interest groups do not know such limitations.  In
many ways, it would be easier for an incumbent judge to face an ac-
tual challenger than be forced alone onto a pedestal to defend his
past decisions to an inflamed public.
C. Weighing the Arguments
Retention elections only solve the problems of cost and ma-
joritarian pressure when voter interest is low.  When interest is
high and issue politics enter the equation, as in the White and Lan-
phier cases, costs skyrocket and the political pressures associated
with competitive elections rear their ugly heads once again.  A
judge who knows that he must soon present himself to voters will
be equally sensitive to majoritarian pressure surrounding a contro-
versial issue in front of him regardless of whether he is to stand for
retention or run for re-election against a challenger.
Merit selection systems present an odd paradox.  In order to
maintain judicial accountability, retention elections are a necessary
element.  However, when retention elections generate significant
public interest, then judicial independence is possibly in greater
danger than if there were competitive elections.  Yet, when reten-
tion elections generate little or no interest, then the effort at ac-
countability proves to be merely a façade.  In addition, merit selec-
tion systems create a mechanism that can be used by the executive
and/or legislative branches to perpetuate the back-slapping, white-
male-dominated political structure.
At best, merit selection can be described as modified ap-
pointment.  At worst, it can be characterized as election by a small,
90. Dann & Hansen, supra note 22, at 1432; Faulkner, supra note 60, at 1279
(citing Hansen, supra note 61, at 69-70).
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elite group.91  Merit systems like Alaska’s attempt to strike a com-
promise between independence and accountability, but instead
create the potential for the worst of both worlds.  If voters do not
care about retention elections, then the system has succeeded in
making judges independent of the whims of popular opinion only
at the cost of any measurable degree of democratic participation.
However, if issue politics pique the interests of voters, then interest
groups, journalists, and other politicians have free reign to lam-
baste a retention candidate for past decisions without presenting a
contrasting alternative, as an opposing candidate would.  Such a
scenario does little to further the cause of judicial independence.
V.  ALASKA MERIT SELECTION REVISITED
Most of the recent debate over merit selection and judicial in-
dependence has arisen in connection with efforts at reform in states
that continue to hold contested judicial elections.  Judicial elections
in states such as Alabama and Mississippi have become highly con-
tentious, exceedingly expensive, and generally nasty affairs.92  The
American Bar Association has long supported the merit selection
concept,93 which has also been promoted by a wide array of judges,
legal scholars, and commentators.94  Reform efforts have generally
failed with voters,95 partly as a result of well-funded counter-
campaigns by interest groups, primarily business interests, that
have recently reconfigured their political activities to focus on the
judicial branch of government (i.e., judicial elections and tort re-
form).96
So what is Alaska to make of the morass of arguments and
counterarguments regarding judicial selection?  Does current resis-
tance to merit selection proposals in other states or the reemer-
gence of big money and issue politics in retention elections suggest
that Alaska reevaluate its own commitment to merit selection?
Does Alaska’s system of judicial selection allow for too much judi-
cial independence at the expense of any meaningful judicial ac-
countability, as some of its critics have contended?
91. Yuda, supra note 47, at 24.
92.  See generally Terry Carter, Boosting the Bench, 88 A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at
28.
93.  Id. at 32.
94. See, e.g., Daugherty, supra note 21, at 339-43; Eid, supra note 6, at 73;
Yuda, supra note 47, at 19, 26.
95. See, e.g., Howard Troxler, Merit-Based Selections Didn’t Fly, Rightly So,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at 1B.  In 2000, Florida voters rejected a
merit selection plan for the state’s trial court judges by a significant majority.  Id.
96. See generally Carter, supra note 92.
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A. Merit Selection and the Alaska Judicial Council in Practice
As of May 1999, “the Council had met approximately 92 times
to nominate candidates to fill 165 judicial vacancies.”97  “Since
1974, the Council has been evaluating judges standing for retention
and making recommendations to voters.”98  Neither Alaska law nor
Council bylaws provide specific criteria by which judicial applicants
and judges up for retention should be evaluated.99  The Council’s
general policy is “to prevent political considerations from out-
weighing fitness in the judicial retention process,” and it has en-
deavored to include as many groups as possible in the evaluation of
judges and judicial applicants.100  Evaluations are based on surveys
of attorneys, peace and probation officers, social workers, court
employees, and jurors.101  In addition, the Council compiles investi-
gative materials specific to each judge and, since 1990, has held
public hearings on “all judges standing for retention.”102  The
Council’s evaluation information and recommendations are in-
cluded in the Official Election Pamphlet that the Lieutenant Gov-
ernor sends to every registered voter in the state and are posted on
the Council’s website.103
From 1984 to 1998, the Council recommended that all but one
judge standing for retention be retained in office.104  Data on judi-
cial retention elections from 1976 to 1996 showed that, on average,
the higher the rating bestowed upon a judge by the Council, the
higher his or her affirmative vote percentage.105  No judge seeking
retention has been defeated since 1982,106 and from 1984 to 1998,
only 15% of judges received less than 64% “yes” votes.107
Very few significant campaigns have been organized against
individual judges.  In 1964, the Alaska bar successfully campaigned
against the retention of Alaska Supreme Court Justice Harry
97. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 24, at 6.
98. Id. at 10-11 (quoting AJC Bylaws, art. I, § 2).
99. Id. at 11.
100. Id. (quoting AJC Bylaws, art. I, § 2).
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 11.
105. ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 77, at 69-72.
106. In 1982, two district court judges, consistent with the Council’s recom-
mendation, were not retained.  FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 24,
at 14.
107. ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 77, at 20.
FINLEY_CORRECTED.DOC 05/07/03  4:35 PM
66 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [20:1
Arend.108  In addition, various grass roots efforts have developed
against particular judges,109 the most recent example of which is the
2000 attempt to defeat Alaska Supreme Court Chief Justice Dana
Fabe’s bid for retention.110  However, none of these efforts have
succeeded in ousting a sitting judge and none have been character-
ized by the big money and high-profile negativity of anti-retention
campaigns in other states.
In addition to the absence of big-money politics, Alaska’s re-
tention elections have also avoided a national trend involving the
percentage of “yes” votes in retention elections.  Studies have
shown that the percentage of affirmative votes cast in judicial re-
tention elections has consistently declined since the early 1960s.111
In contrast, the percentage of Alaska voters casting affirmative
votes in judicial retention elections remained remarkably constant
between 1984 and 1998, as illustrated in the following table.
108. Id. at 14 n.36 (“as part of an effort to politically limit the supreme court’s
authority over Bar activities”).
109. Id. at 14.
110. Chief Justice Fabe was targeted because of two controversial cases de-
cided by the Alaska Supreme Court.  See Ruth Ewig, Letter to the Editor, “No”
on Fabe, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 2000, at 9B; Ann Lohrey, Letter to
the Editor, Get Fabe off the Bench, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 16, 2000, at
6B; see also Valley Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963,
972 (Alaska 1997) (holding a state statute allowing hospitals to decline to provide
abortion services “for reasons of moral conscience” unconstitutional as applied to
a quasi-public hospital); Area G Home & Landowners Org., Inc. v. City of An-
chorage, 927 P.2d 728, 739 (Alaska 1996) (interpreting an Anchorage city charter
to allow the city to expand its police service area to include a new area that had
previously voted against expansion, without giving residents of that area a sepa-
rate vote on the expansion).  Chief Justice Fabe wrote the court’s opinion in the
Area G case, 927 P.2d at 729, but she did not participate in the decision of the
Valley Hospital Ass’n case, 948 P.2d at 973.  Chief Justice Fabe was retained with a
57% “yes” vote.  State of Alaska, Division of Elections, Election Summary Re-
port, State of Alaska General Election 2000, at 7, available at
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect00/00genr/data/results.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 14, 2003).
111. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, What Twenty Years of Judicial Reten-
tion Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 344 (1987); Larry T. Aspin &
William K. Hall et al., Thirty Years of Judicial Retention Elections: An Update, 37
SOC. SCI. J. 1, 4 (2000); Daugherty, supra note 21, at 323-25.
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Table 1 – Alaska Vote Percentages by Year112









Commentators have attributed the observed national decline in af-
firmative votes to a corresponding general decline of public trust in
the government.113  Whatever the cause, this does not appear to be
a pronounced problem in Alaska.
Alaska’s judiciary does, however, suffer from one negative
characteristic often attributed to merit selection systems—dispa-
rate representation of women and minorities.  Of Alaska’s forty-
one sitting judges, only nine are women and only two are of minor-
ity status.114  Both minority judges and eight of the nine female
judges are at the superior court level.115  Given the makeup of the
state’s population,116 the absence of any state judges of Native
American descent is especially disconcerting.
B. The Argument For and the Attempted Redemption of Judicial
Elections
The primary criticism of judicial elections is that they are in-
herently in conflict with the notion of judicial independence.  Pro-
ponents of appointment or merit selection contend that because an
112. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 24, at 19.
113. ASPIN & HALL, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have
Told Us,  supra note 111, at 344.
114. American Judicature Society, “Judicial Selection in the States,” http://
www.ajs.org/js/AK.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).  Alaska has one African
American superior court judge and one Asian/Pacific Islander superior court
judge.  Id.  Alaska has no Native American or Hispanic judges at any of the three
primary levels.  Id.
115. Id.
116. Native Americans or Alaska Natives make up 15.6% of the state’s popula-
tion.  U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, Alaska, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
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elected judiciary is accountable to the majority, it cannot be relied
upon to protect the rights of the minority.  A judiciary system in-
sulated from majoritarian pressures may uphold one bedrock of
American democracy—individual rights, but it runs contrary to an-
other—public participation.
The judicial function is undeniably different from the execu-
tive and legislative functions.  It is not representative, but rather
based on interpretation.  However, judges do not and cannot oper-
ate in a cultural vacuum.  Judges are part of the communities
whose people come to their courts seeking justice.  Their decisions
reflect the values and ethics of those communities.  Flawed as they
may be, judicial elections foster a brand of justice that is both
authoritative and responsive.  Shirley Abrahamson, Chief Justice
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, has described the mutually edu-
cational experience that elective systems can provide:
Judges who are running for election take the time to ride with
law enforcement officers, make rounds with social workers and
doctors, visit schools and factories, and lunch with the fork-and-
knife clubs and bar associations.  These visits give a judge the
opportunity to understand the legal system from the perspective
of the users: litigants and lawyers . . . .  Elections can increase the
citizen’s understanding of the judicial function and the need for
judicial independence.  The public’s appreciation of and respect
for judicial independence is, I think, the best way to ensure that
the judiciary will remain independent.117
Despite the benefits of a popularly elected judiciary and not-
withstanding Jefferson’s fear that “the office of a good judge [is] to
enlarge his jurisdiction” would hold true in a judicial system inde-
pendent of the nation,118 judicial elections are no longer desirable
options in the modern political world.  As early as 1906, Roscoe
Pound observed that “compelling judges to become politicians . . .
has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench.”119  A
number of options are available to states hoping to maintain sys-
tems of judicial elections while controlling the excesses and abuses
that have come to be associated with them. Almost all states have
ethical provisions relating to statements made by candidates for ju-
dicial office120 and many have campaign finance regulations specific
117. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973,
977 (2001).
118. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 74
(1984).
119. The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,
8 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 23 (1956) (reprinting a speech given by Pound to the Ameri-
can Bar Association).
120. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5 (2000).
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to judicial candidates.121  However, the U.S. Constitution limits the
effectiveness of such provisions in “civilizing” judicial campaigns.
Buckley v. Valeo122 held that spending limits are constitutional only
when accepted voluntarily as a condition on the receipt of public
funds,123 and likely prevents states from imposing any significant
controls on the activities of interest groups.124  Most recently, in Re-
publican Party of Minnesota v. White,125 the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a state ethical canon that prevented a candidate
for judicial office from “announc[ing] his or her views on disputed
legal or political issues.”126  “If the State chooses to tap the energy
and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must ac-
cord the participants in that process . . . the First Amendment
rights that attach to their roles.”127  Some commentators have gone
so far as to say that contested judicial elections are no longer de-
fensible in light of these interpretations of the First Amendment.128
Many states have attempted to take the politics out of judicial
elections by going to a nonpartisan format.  These efforts have
been criticized from a number of different perspectives.  In 1913,
then former President and future Chief Justice William Howard
Taft argued that nonpartisan elections would magnify the problems
of elective judiciaries because the lack of the filtering function per-
formed by political parties would allow unqualified candidates to
get on the ballot and get elected.129  More recently, commentators
have observed that party politics invariably resurface in nonparti-
san elections in the form of partisan cues or contributions and en-
dorsements by individuals or interest groups with readily identifi-
able partisan leanings.130
121. See, e.g., id. Canons 3 & 5.
122. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
123. Id. at 57 n.65.
124. It has been argued that, at least in the context of campaign finance regula-
tions, judicial elections are distinguishable from legislative or executive elections,
but such distinctions have been rejected.  See Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 529-
30 (6th Cir. 1998).
125. 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).
126. Id. at 2542.
127. Id. at 2541 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting)).
128. Paul D. Carrington & Adam Long, Selecting Pennsylvania Judges in the
Twenty-First Century, 106 DICK. L. REV. 747, 747 (2002).
129. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 723-24 (1995).
130. See generally Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1411, 1418-20 (2001).
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Several states, most notably Wisconsin, have recently made ef-
forts to enact public financing of judicial races.131  The case for pub-
lic financing of judicial elections is much stronger than the case for
funding legislative and executive races.  Legislatures and executives
are supposed to be representatives of the electorate.  The problem
with private financing of legislative and executive races is not that
it enables contributors to influence decision-making, but that it al-
lows “contributors to influence governmental decision-making
more than other constituents.”132  In the context of judicial offices,
however, any influence on decision-making is inappropriate.
Forcing judges to raise money creates an appearance of impropri-
ety, burdens the time and energy of judges, and also discourages
qualified candidates from pursuing or remaining in judicial office.133
Although held to be constitutional,134 attempts at public financing
have recently sputtered.  Wisconsin’s program to publicly fund ju-
dicial elections currently suffers from significant financing prob-
lems as a result of decreasing taxpayer participation in the one
dollar state tax return check-off system that funds the program.135
In addition, voters in Missouri and Oregon, states that have a dem-
onstrated history of support for campaign finance reform, recently
rejected ballot initiatives that would have implemented public fi-
nancing programs.136
C. Balancing Independence and Accountability
Merit selection seeks to create a fair, just, and compassionate
judiciary by striving to balance two possibly irreconcilable charac-
teristics: judicial independence and judicial accountability.
Alaska’s merit selection system is designed to ensure that the
state’s judges are highly qualified and not selected as a result of
popular or political whim, resulting in a system of initial selection
that fosters a considerable amount of independence. Alaska’s sys-
tem of retention elections is intended to provide both a degree of
accountability because judges must face the public and a degree of
131.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Over-
view, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1476-78 (2001)(discussing the partisan nature of
several judicial elections over the past several years).
132. Id. at 1472.
133. For a discussion of public funding options and alternatives, see generally
id.
134. See Dagget v. Comm’n on Govt’l Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d
445, 459 (1st Cir. 2000).
135. Geyh, supra note 131, at 1477-78 & apps. B & C.
136. Roy A. Schotland, Campaign Finance in Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1489, 1505 (2001).
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further independence because the judges appear on the ballot un-
opposed.  Some critics might argue that Alaska has allowed for too
much judicial independence at the expense of any meaningful ac-
countability, while others might contend that Alaska has failed to
provide adequate judicial independence by not insulating judges
from voters entirely.
The goal of any process of judicial selection should be a fair,
just, and compassionate judiciary.  Judicial independence is an im-
portant, perhaps necessary, approach to the attainment of such a
court system, but it is not the ultimate goal.  Judicial independence
might be better conceived of as a means to an end, rather than the
end itself.  Any system of judicial selection, evaluation, or retention
will inherently hinder judicial independence.137  However, judicial
independence requires neither a system that maintains judges in of-
fice indefinitely, nor that judges be completely insulated from the
will of the public.
Depending on one’s point of view, the fact that very few
judges have been turned out by Alaska voters in retention elections
might indicate that the merit selection system is an excellent
method of choosing talented and qualified judges.  Alternatively, it
might indicate that the system of retention elections weighs too
heavily in favor of incumbent judges.  There is some empirical data
to support the former proposition,138 and the experiences of other
states with high profile, big-money retention votes weigh against
the latter.  Perhaps the strongest criticism of retention elections is
that they do not effectively take interest and issue politics out of
the judicial selection process and allow for well-financed interest
groups to conduct vicious campaigns against relatively defenseless
judges.  This criticism would seem to suggest that retention elec-
tions do provide meaningful judicial accountability, perhaps even
at the expense of judicial independence.
VI.  INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY IN
ALASKA’S MERIT SELECTION SYSTEM
While Alaska’s system of judicial retention may provide for a
degree of accountability, its system of judicial selection is notably
lacking in that respect.  Alaska’s merit selection system has served
137. One survey found that 28.2% of judges believed that their state’s evalua-
tion process undermined their independence as judges.  ESTERLING & SAMPSON,
supra note 105, at 44 tbl.IV-7 (Two of the nine Alaska judges in the survey be-
lieved that the Council’s method of evaluation undermined judicial independ-
ence).
138. FOSTERING JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, supra note 24, at 33-67, 69.
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the state well and has been cited by experts as a model program of
its kind.139  However, as evidenced by recent criticisms,140 the system
does allow for a great deal of judicial independence with little cor-
responding accountability.  The following are proposed measures
to increase the degree of accountability to which Alaska judges are
held without sacrificing a great deal of judicial independence.
A. Election of Attorney Members of the Alaska Judicial Council
Under the Alaska merit system, the Board of Governors of the
Alaska Bar Association appoints the three attorney members of
the Council.141  The purpose of this provision was to give the inte-
grated bar the opportunity to be represented and heard regarding
who would sit on the bench.142  A system of appointment by the
Board of Governors, while likely efficient and uncomplicated, has
the potential of narrowing the opinions and views of the bar that
are actually represented on the Council.  The attorneys who are
appointed to the Council owe their positions to the governing pow-
ers in the Alaska bar and will almost surely represent the views of
the state’s most powerful and successful lawyers.  This system of
selecting Council members gives rise to the same accountability-
independence problem that makes judicial selection so problem-
atic.
The Alaska Constitution should be amended so as to provide
for the election of the three attorney members of the Council by
the entire Alaska bar.  Each member of the Alaska Bar Associa-
tion should be able to vote for candidates for Council positions, en-
suring that the views of all practicing attorneys are represented in
the judicial selection process.  One possible objection to the elec-
tion of attorney Council members might be that such a system
would bring politics back into judicial selection.  This criticism is
unfounded, however, since only attorneys would be voting, and
they would presumably be more informed than the general public
about the law, what qualities make for a good judge, and which
members of the bar are most qualified to sit on the Council. 
139. Id. at 69 (“[T]he high quality of Alaska’s bench suggested in turn that the
Judicial Council’s selection process has, over the past fourteen years, succeeded in
identifying highly qualified judicial applicants.”).
140. For an account of criticisms of Alaska’s current system of judicial selec-
tion, see supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
141. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8.
142. Minutes, supra note 51, at 590.
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B. Increased Legislative Participation
Certain members of the Alaska legislature have objected to its
almost non-existent role in judicial selection.143  Under Alaska’s
merit system, the legislature’s only participation in the judicial se-
lection process comes in the form of voting to confirm the gover-
nor’s nominations to fill the three layperson positions on the
Alaska Judicial Council.144  The role of the legislature could be in-
creased within the framework of the current merit system in one of
three ways: (1) provide for confirmation by the Alaska legislature
of judicial appointees; (2) provide for confirmation by the Alaska
legislature of attorney members appointed to the Council by the
Alaska bar; or (3) spread the power to appoint non-attorney mem-
bers to the Council among three different elected officials.
First, requiring judicial appointees to be confirmed by the leg-
islature would be repetitive and could create an arena for political
grandstanding.  The federal system of judicial selection relies on
the Senate to be a check against the President’s exercise of his ap-
pointment power.  Senate confirmation hearings on judicial nomi-
nees are designed to assess the qualifications and integrity of the
nominee.  Of course, recent confirmation hearings have become
highly politicized, but they still serve their basic constitutional pur-
pose.
Legislative confirmation would serve a different purpose when
used in conjunction with a traditional merit selection system.  Giv-
ing the state legislature the power to examine and confirm indi-
viduals already approved by the Council and appointed by the gov-
ernor would be repetitive and pointless.  The nominating
commission would have already served as a screening process, one
which presumably approved of the candidate’s qualifications.  The
only purpose that confirmation hearings could serve would be a re-
assurance that the governor and the nominating commission were
not collaborating to get an inferior or inappropriate candidate on
the bench.
The second option, legislative confirmation of attorneys ap-
pointed to the Judicial Council, would also be repetitive and would
undermine the voice of the Alaska bar in the judicial selection pro-
cess.  The point of having positions on the Judicial Council specifi-
cally designated for attorneys is to ensure the presence of the indi-
143. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 15, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999) (inserting provi-
sions giving the legislature more control over the appointment and confirmation
process); Press Release, supra note 35 (citing a need for the legislative and execu-
tive branches to place checks on the judiciary’s growing power).
144. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 8.
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viduals most familiar with the field and the potential candidates.
Legislative confirmation would do nothing to serve this purpose
and would only lead to delay and confusion.
Both of these options also create a forum for interest group
politics to regain influence in the judicial selection process.
Alaska’s merit selection system has done an admirable job of
avoiding the political spectacle that often characterizes the federal
appointment process and judicial elections in many states.  For ex-
ample, Alabama Supreme Court races have been described as
“battleground[s] between businesses and those who sue them,”145
and judicial selection processes in Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, and Texas have all been beset
by waves of political activity and campaign contributions by trial
lawyers, civil defense lawyers, law enforcement associations, insur-
ance companies, labor unions, and business, environmental, and
religious groups.146  Additionally, an increasing amount of this ac-
tivity has been spearheaded by national rather than local organiza-
tions.147  The Alaska bar is the only interest group148 that is currently
afforded the opportunity to participate in the judicial selection pro-
cess.  Other interest groups must wait until retention elections,
three years after the fact, to weigh in on particular judges and their
positions.149
While the first two options are fraught with pitfalls, the third
option—spreading the power to appoint non-attorney Council
members among three elected officials—is intriguing and very
145. Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of
Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 656 (1999) (citing David White,
Campaign Cash Ready to Flow: Siegelman Has a Jump on James, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Mar. 26, 1998, at 1B).
146. Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1391, 1395-1403 (2001).
147. See id. at 1399.
148. In fact, it is somewhat cumbersome to even consider the Alaska bar as a
single interest group.  The Bar Association represents a number of competing in-
terest groups who, if they were allowed to participate in the process directly,
would likely take opposing positions (e.g., trial lawyers and civil defense attorneys
or prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys).
149. Theoretically, interest groups could seek to assert their influence at two
other levels: (1) the governor’s nomination and the legislature’s confirmation of
the three non-attorney Council positions; and (2) the governor’s final appointment
decision from among the slate of nominees presented by the Council.  However,
these two occasions for action are very limited.  Even assuming that a particular
interest group was able to gain the support of the governor and a majority of the
legislature, that would still not create a veto point since a majority of the seven-
member Council would still be outside of that group’s realm of influence.
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practical.  Currently, the governor appoints three non-attorney
members to the Judicial Council.  These individuals are intended to
represent the views and interests of the public in the judicial selec-
tion process.  Nothing in their purpose inherently requires that they
be appointed by the governor.  In fact, the governor’s power over
the non-attorney judicial council members is part of what creates
the potential for cronyism and undue influence in the judicial selec-
tion process.
The Alaska Constitution could be amended to give the gover-
nor, the speaker of the house, and the president pro-tempore of the
Senate the power to each appoint one non-attorney to the Judicial
Council.  This would give the legislature more direct say in the
composition of the Judicial Council, decrease the potential for cro-
nyism, and increase the points of view represented on the Coun-
cil.150  This change would weaken the political influences bearing on
the Judicial Council by making them more diverse, and thus less
acute.
C. Ethical Rules and Standards in the Judicial Selection Process
If the members of the Alaska Judicial Council are supposed to
ignore politics and refrain from considering certain things, then it
would be beneficial to provide a code of conduct for Judicial Coun-
cil members listing specific “do’s” and “do not’s.”  For example, a
rule prohibiting members from discussing the work of the Judicial
Council once a vacancy arises would protect the public image of
the process and allow the Council to function free of encum-
brances.  Likewise, a rule prohibiting the governor (or any other
elected official granted the power of appointment) from discussing
a “litmus test” or other approach to evaluating judicial candidates
with potential nominees to the Council would ensure that Council
members focus on the merits of individual applicants.  Addition-
ally, there could be a rule proscribing Council members from em-
ploying “litmus tests” themselves in evaluating applicants.  These
rules would obviously be difficult to monitor and enforce, but their
very existence would lend credibility to the process and clarify
what is expected of the Judicial Council and those who interact
with it.
D. Increased Transparency in the Selection Process
The desire of the public and some lawmakers for a more ac-
countable judiciary is largely the result of unfamiliarity with the ju-
150. A similar proposal was considered by the Missouri legislature in the early
1990s.  Daugherty, supra note 21, at 329 & n.100.
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dicial process.  The greatest threat to democratic government is an
ignorant and apathetic populace.  Increased access to and aware-
ness of the functions of the Judicial Council and the courts in gen-
eral will go a long way toward increasing public confidence in the
judiciary.  The Alaska Judicial Council is already recognized across
the nation as a leader in evaluating judges and distributing that in-
formation to voters in connection with retention elections.151  There
is no reason to believe that the Council could not be equally effec-
tive in informing the general public about the initial merit selection
process.
Additionally, the Judicial Council could open interviews of
candidates to the public and the press.  The Judicial Council could
use television, radio, and newspapers to distribute information
about retention elections and the selection process.  The Alaska
courts could expand the use of cameras in the courtroom to better
familiarize the public with the workings of the judicial system and
the role played by judges.  The judiciary cannot rely on interest
groups to focus attention on retention elections.  Instead, voters
must become more knowledgeable of the issues involved in reten-
tion elections beyond inflammatory issue politics.
VII.  CONCLUSION
Experience has proven judicial independence to be an illusive
goal.  What or whom should the judiciary be independent of—the
voting electorate, the power elite, or both?  How and to whom
should judges be held accountable, if at all?  These questions have
been debated since the founding of this nation and emphasize the
competing notions of democratic theory on which our nation is
based.  Which system of judicial selection is best in a given context
depends in large part on the particular society at hand, and even, to
a certain extent, the particular point in time.
Any method of selecting judges will inherently undermine ju-
dicial independence.  The question then becomes—should we have
greater faith in the ability of the many (the electorate) to choose
judges, or the few (elite commissions or political officials)?  A
meaningful commitment to judicial accountability allows for voter
input, increases public awareness of the operations of the judicial
system, and prevents political cronyism from taking hold of the
administration of justice.  Judicial accountability may cause judges
to be influenced by the twists and turns of public opinion, but per-
151. See generally Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2001); ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 105; Trox-
ler, supra note 95.
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haps that is a good thing.  Law is supposed to be an expression of
the culture, values, and sentiments of the society that it governs.
“[W]e should look with more of hope and confidence than of doubt
and apprehension to the working of an elective judiciary . . . . [T]he
people will support [judges] who oppose their wishes on the bench
when such opposition is exercised conscientiously.  Boldness men
admire, even when opposed to their wills . . . .”152  Alaska’s system
of judicial selection and retention reflects a meaningful commit-
ment to judicial independence.  Alaska must now ensure that it has
made an equally strong commitment to judicial accountability
within the framework of its system of merit selection.
Tillman J. Finley
152. Abrahamson, supra note 117, at 1003-04 (quoting public debate over the
Wisconsin state constitutional provision for electing judges) (citations omitted).
